Thinking about MacIntyre again, he argues that the current state of moral belief across much of the world (but particularly in western countries) is one of emotivism. Emotivism emerged as a theory of the meaning of moral utterances, but is better seen as an explanation of the use of moral utterances, rather than the meaning. In this light, emotivism says that, whenever we say something, such as “X is bad,” what we’re really saying is “I don’t like X, do likewise.” In other words, it’s an attempt to manipulate the beliefs and actions of others around us. We treat moral statements as if they don’t actually have any objective bearing on our action. Emotivism, then, is the overpowering of one will over another, forcing on another person their moral code. It’s no wonder then why we frequently hear in debates, “Don’t force your beliefs on me.” How do we as Christians and philosophers go about regaining our lost moral high ground?
It is possible to defeat emotivism intellectually. The theory proper grows out of Humean philosophy, but the spirit is decidedly Nietzschean, each of which have their flaws. However, I don’t think that the philosophical argument against the theory is all that compelling to our culture, mainly because this manipulative interpretation of morals is so embedded that it goes unnoticed by most. Rather, I think we might do better to look at what freedom truly is and what morality is in the face of Nietzschean philosophy. The modern American (and probably western as a whole) interpretation of freedom smacks of Nietzsche’s will to power. It is about alternatives and the ability to choose whatever alternative you wish. This is why religion is believed to be shackles imposed on the weak by the strong. It closes off certain alternatives, and in doing so, restricts our freedom so that we are no longer free, but slaves. If this definition of freedom is true, then this is certainly the case, and such is the implicit mindset of our culture.
But I don’t think that most realize what exactly this entails. Radical freedom of this nature views any and every limitation imposed on it as an affront to the nature of the person. The government, contracts, basic business transactions, even bonds of friendship and family all impose limitations upon our actions. Are we to cast all of these off in order to become a radically free, self-made man? Nietzsche says yes, and there is an extent to which the culture agrees. But it still wants limitations in place for when things don’t go the way we want them to. Someone like the Joker is a great example of this. No one wants a society that creates the Joker and accepts him, even holds him up as a great role model of a self-made man who has cast off all burdens of morality, all constraints on his behavior. But that’s also exactly what we’re telling people to do. It’s what a culture driven by emotivism strives for and fears to achieve at the same time. It’s a horribly conflicted mindset we’re told to have. And all these consequences stem from the core belief that freedom is the raw ability to choose. If it’s not that, what is it?
I really can see only one alternative. Maybe that’s partially because I haven’t thought about it hard enough, or maybe it’s because there really is only one other alternative, as the two are mutually incompatible. The freedom of virtue ethicists such as Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas is the ability to choose the good. Not just any good, but true goods, for Aquinas, the Ultimate Good, God Himself. This requires a completely different world view than our modern one where I am completely free to decide what my ultimate happiness lies in, if anything. Freedom is my ability to perfect myself according to the nature inherent to me, and as such, is bound up in the pursuit of such perfection.
Maybe this then is how we can evangelize against an emotivistic culture: get them to the point of realizing that their very concept of freedom is hopelessly flawed so that they ask themselves what else is there? The concept of slavery to addiction is ready to be used, and it is obviously an evil, so there must be a freedom which is the opposite. The only one that I can think of is Aristotelean. Perhaps I’m mistaken in this, but it’s the best avenue that I can think of.
yourresidentphilosopher 